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NONINCORPORATION:  THE  BILL  OF  RIGHTS
AFTER MCDONALD  V.  CHICAGO
Suja A. Thomas*
Very few rights in the Bill of Rights have not been incorporated against the
states.  In McDonald v. Chicago, the Supreme Court held that the Second
Amendment right to bear arms, which the Court previously had decided did not
apply against states, was incorporated.  This decision left only three, what this
Article terms, “nonincorporated” rights—the Fifth Amendment grand jury
right, the Sixth Amendment criminal jury unanimity requirement, and the Sev-
enth Amendment civil jury trial right—rights that the Court previously decided
do not apply against the states that remain not incorporated.  After the decision
to incorporate the right to bear arms, an important unaddressed question with
far-reaching implications is whether nonincorporation is defensible under the
Court’s jurisprudence.  Scholars to date have viewed the Bill of Rights exclu-
sively through theories of incorporation, including the theory of selective incor-
poration under which incorporation occurs if a fundamental right exists.  This
Article is the first to view incorporation from the perspective of a theory of
nonincorporation.  This theory could be simply the opposite of selective incorpo-
ration—that a right is not fundamental—or, it could be, that the Court has
not incorporated rights for some other reason.  This Article sets forth possible
theories of nonincorporation, both prior to and after McDonald, and explor-
ing their viability, concludes that no nonincorporation theory is defensible
under the Court’s jurisprudence.  The resulting incorporation of the
nonincorporated rights would change the administration of justice in the states
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and also would make the Court’s theory of selective incorporation more
justifiable.
INTRODUCTION
For many years, justices of the Supreme Court have articulated
theories regarding whether rights in the Bill of Rights apply against
the states to defend their decisions on which rights apply against the
states.1  Likewise, using such theories, scholars have argued for and
against the application of rights in the Bill against the states.2  Also,
over time, many of the rights that the Court initially decided do not
apply against the states shifted to decisions to incorporate.3  However,
certain rights have remained “nonincorporated.”4
The question of incorporation has never been viewed from the
perspective of “nonincorporation.”  Prior to McDonald v. Chicago, in
what this Article terms the “nonincorporation” decisions, the Court
decided against incorporating the Second Amendment right to bear
arms,5 the Fifth Amendment grand jury right,6 the Sixth Amendment
criminal jury unanimity requirement,7 and the Seventh Amendment
civil jury trial right.8
In McDonald, the Court incorporated the Second Amendment
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the plurality under selective
incorporation under the Due Process Clause,9 and Justice Thomas
1 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3028–36 (2010).
2 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 215–30 (1998) (using refined
incorporation to argue for and against incorporation of parts of the Bill); RAOUL BER-
GER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 155–89 (2d ed. 1997) (arguing against incorporation
of the Bill); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 92–130 (1986) (arguing
for the incorporation of the Bill); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981) (arguing against
incorporation of the Bill). See generally WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT (1988) (reviewing scholarship, examining new sources regarding incorporation,
and viewing incorporation from equality angle).
3 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3028–36.
4 See id. at 3035 n.13.
5 See Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894) (right to bear arms not incorporated);
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) (same); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1875) (same).
6 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (right to grand jury not
incorporated).
7 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (Sixth Amendment criminal jury
unanimity requirement not incorporated).
8 See Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916) (Seventh
Amendment right to civil jury trial not incorporated).
9 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026–50.
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who concurred under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.10  In the
decision, the Court left open the possibility that the Fifth Amendment
grand jury right, the Sixth Amendment criminal jury unanimity
requirement, and the Seventh Amendment civil jury trial right could
be incorporated in the future.  It emphasized that in past decisions on
the Fifth Amendment grand jury right and the Seventh Amendment
civil jury trial right, it had decided against incorporation prior to
selective incorporation, similar to the pre-McDonald decisions on the
Second Amendment.11  For the remaining right that it had affirma-
tively decided not to incorporate against the states in the past—the
Sixth Amendment criminal jury unanimity requirement—the Court
stressed that an odd decision had resulted from the division of the
Court in that case.12  Importantly, a “single, neutral principle” based
on whether a right was fundamental should guide the incorporation
of the Bill of Rights against the states; only this principle and, if appli-
cable, stare decisis stood in the way of incorporation of the remaining
nonincorporated rights in the Bill.13  In dissent, Justice Stevens criti-
cized the plurality’s opinion by, among other things, pointing out the
parts of the Bill of Rights that the Court had decided did not apply
against the states, and the unwillingness of the Court to grant certio-
rari on the unanimity question.14
Scholars have never studied the nonincorporated rights and
examined whether the Court has a theory of nonincorporation.  The
theory could be simply the opposite of selective incorporation—that a
right is not fundamental—or, it could be, that the Court has not
incorporated the rights for some other reasons.  This Article explores
these possible theories of nonincorporation.  It further discusses
whether nonincorporation of the Fifth Amendment grand jury right,
the Sixth Amendment criminal jury unanimity requirement, and the
Seventh Amendment civil jury trial right is justifiable under any such
theory of nonincorporation.
Part I begins with a brief discussion of the theories of incorpora-
tion that existed prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonald.
Next, the Court’s decisions not to incorporate the Second Amend-
ment right to bear arms, the Fifth Amendment grand jury right, the
Sixth Amendment criminal jury unanimity requirement, and the Sev-
enth Amendment civil jury trial right are discussed.  Then, there is a
10 See id. at 3058–88 (Thomas, J., concurring).
11 See id. at 3035 n.13.
12 See id. at 3035 n.14.
13 Id. at 3048.
14 See id. at 3094 & n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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description of the possible theories of nonincorporation prior to
McDonald.  After a discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in
McDonald the possible theories of nonincorporation after McDonald
are set forth.  Part II examines the future of nonincorporation.  It
begins with a fresh examination of each of the nonincorporated provi-
sions under the incorporation theory articulated in McDonald and also
briefly discusses the rights in the Bill that the Court has never
examined at all for application against the states.  After deciding that
the nonincorporated provisions are fundamental rights, the circum-
stances for stare decisis are explored and dismissed.  The Article con-
cludes that a nonincorporation theory is not defensible under the
Court’s current due process jurisprudence.
I. NONINCORPORATION UNDER THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
SUPREME COURT
Prior to McDonald v. Chicago, the Supreme Court decided that the
Second Amendment right to bear arms, the Fifth Amendment grand
jury right, the Sixth Amendment criminal jury unanimity require-
ment, and the Seventh Amendment civil jury trial right did not apply
against the states.15  This Article refers to these decisions not to incor-
porate certain rights under the Bill of Rights as the “nonincorpora-
tion” decisions.  In McDonald, the Court incorporated the Second
Amendment.  This Part explores the Court’s possible theories of
nonincorporation prior to and after McDonald.
A. Theories of Incorporating Rights in the Bill of Rights Against the States
To examine possible theories of nonincorporation of rights, it is
helpful to start with a brief look at how incorporation of rights under
the Bill of Rights has been viewed to date by the Supreme Court and
scholars.  In the first decision on the application of rights in the Bill to
the states, Barron v. Baltimore,16 the Supreme Court rejected that the
Bill of Rights applied against the states.17  After the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, in the Slaughter-House Cases,18 the Court also
dismissed any notion that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protected significantly against states’ intru-
15 See id. at 3035 nn.13–14; cf. AMAR, supra note 2, at 269 (discussing that the Fifth
Amendment grand jury right and Seventh Amendment in addition to the Second
Amendment have not been incorporated).
16 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
17 See id.
18 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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sion on rights.19  Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the Court
examined whether pursuant to the Due Process Clause in the Four-
teenth Amendment, rights in the Bill should be incorporated against
the states.20  In these cases, the Court decided: whether a right was
within due process was not related to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause;21 due process protected rights against state infringement if
they were “in the conception of due process of law” and “not because
those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments;”22 the
right did not apply to the states if a civilized system could be imagined
that would not accord the particular protection;23 some parts of the
Bill of Rights applied against the states and some did not;24 and the
state right was not always the same as the federal right.25  In the 1960s,
the Court began “selective incorporation” by deciding that the “Due
Process Clause fully incorporates particular rights contained in the
first eight Amendments.”26  Under this incorporation theory, the right
was incorporated if it was essential to liberty and justice and therefore
was a fundamental right.27  In the process of selective incorporation,
the Court rejected the civilized society requirement,28 it embraced the
incorporation of the rights in the Bill,29 and it rejected different inter-
pretations of rights for the states and for the federal government.30
Importantly, many of the rights that the Court previously had decided
were not incorporated were deemed incorporated.31
19 See id.
20 See, e.g., Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
In this Article, “incorporation” is used to describe any application of rights in the Bill
against the states.  Scholars have used the term “incorporation” in this general man-
ner for many years.
21 See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113–14 (1908).
22 Id. at 99.  At times, in the decisions, the Court stated that to be within due
process, it must be “shocking to the universal sense of justice” not to provide the right
in the particular circumstances. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462, 471 (1942)
(denying lawyer for indigent defendant); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328
(1937) (finding state appeal of no conviction not a denial of due process).
23 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–60 & n.14 (1968).
24 See, e.g., Twining, 211 U.S. at 113–14.
25 See, e.g., Betts, 316 U.S. at 468–72. McDonald v. Chicago described this history of
incorporation. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3031–32 (2010).
26 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034 (citing several cases incorporating various rights).
27 Id.
28 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149–50 & n.14.
29 See id. at 149.
30 See id. McDonald v. Chicago described this history of incorporation. See 130 S.
Ct. at 3034.
31 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036.
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As this brief history describes, justices of the Supreme Court have
discussed theories of incorporation, some under the Due Process
Clause and some under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Justice
Black is the most well-known judicial advocate for incorporation
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  He propounded what has
been referred to as “total incorporation” of the Bill of Rights.32  He
believed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Privileges
or Immunities of citizens of the United States contained in the Bill
against the states.33  Justice Brennan proposed “selective incorpora-
tion”—the incorporation of fundamental rights in the Bill pursuant to
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.34  Justice
Frankfurter, on the other hand, had the view that no part of the Bill
was “incorporated” against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.35
Professor Akhil Reed Amar also has discussed incorporation.  In
one of the most acclaimed books on the Bill of Rights, he discussed
the theories of incorporation, including Justice Black’s total incorpo-
ration and Justice Brennan’s selective incorporation.36  Professor
Amar argued, contrary to the view of Justice Black, that Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment did not limit itself to incorporation of
rights in the Bill of Rights.37  Furthermore, the rights in the Bill and
elsewhere in the Constitution did not neatly apply against the states;
indeed some were states’ rights provisions.38  Professor Amar also
found difficulties with Justice Brennan’s selective incorporation,
which, similar to Justice Black’s approach, failed to address the possi-
ble incorporation of other parts of the Constitution and which may
have been simply an approach taken—right by right—to accomplish
32 See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 162–63 (Black, J., concurring); Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 46, 71–72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
33 See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 71–72.
34 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1964); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of
Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 545–46 (1986).
35 See Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum on “Incorporation” of the Bill of Rights into the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 746, 748 (1965) (criti-
cizing the term “incorporation” and stating “[t]he sense of the word ‘incorporate’
implies simultaneity,” which is not an accurate description); cf. Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that forced procedure to retract pills “shocks the
conscience” and thus violates due process).
36 See AMAR, supra note 2, at 219. R
37 See id.
38 See id.
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total incorporation; when considering each right, Justice Brennan
invariably had decided that the right was fundamental.39
Professor Amar himself proposed “refined incorporation” as the
proper manner to decide issues of incorporation.40  To decide ques-
tions of incorporation, Professor Amar emphasized the necessity of
examining “the spirit of the amendment of 1866, not the Bill of
1789,”41 and he stated that the appropriate question was “whether
[the right] is a personal privilege—that is, a private right—of individ-
ual citizens, rather than a right of states or the public at large.”42
Under this theory, some parts of the Bill and the Constitution will not
be incorporated because they are not personal privileges or private
rights.43  Further, “the reason [that certain rights are not incorpo-
rated] is not that these rules and subdoctrines are not fundamental;
rather, it is that they may reflect federalism and other structural con-
cerns unique to the central government.”44  How Amar applied his
theory to the Second Amendment right to bear arms, the Fifth
Amendment grand jury right, and Seventh Amendment civil jury trial
right will be described below.45
B. Nonincorporation Jurisprudence Before McDonald
The Supreme Court has overruled most of its decisions in which
it decided not to incorporate rights in the Bill against the states.46
However, prior to McDonald, the Court had not overruled its decisions
not to incorporate the Second Amendment right to bear arms, the
Fifth Amendment grand jury right, the Sixth Amendment criminal
jury unanimity requirement, and the Seventh Amendment civil jury
trial right.47  An examination of these nonincorporation decisions
provides an opportunity to analyze the Court’s possible theories of
nonincorporation prior to McDonald.
1. The Second Amendment Right to Bear Arms
Prior to McDonald, in several cases before selective incorporation,
the Supreme Court had decided that the Second Amendment right to
39 See id. at 21920.
40 Id. at 21530.
41 Id. at 223.
42 Id. at 221.
43 See id.
44 Id. at 222.
45 See infra Part I.B.
46 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
47 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. R
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bear arms48 did not apply against the states under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.49  Responding to
this jurisprudence, a number of scholars criticized the Court’s failure
to incorporate this amendment.50
2. The Fifth Amendment Grand Jury Right
Prior to the time that the Supreme Court decided McDonald, the
Supreme Court also had decided that the Fifth Amendment grand
jury right51 did not apply against the states.52  In Hurtado v. California,
a late nineteenth-century case, the Court considered the question of
whether the Fifth Amendment grand jury right was incorporated
against the states pursuant to the Due Process Clause in the Four-
teenth Amendment.53  There, California did not require a grand jury
to present or indict a person accused of a crime but instead permitted
a magistrate to examine and commit an information.54  A jury con-
victed Hurtado of murder without presentment or indictment by a
grand jury,55 and Hurtado appealed the conviction, for which he was
sentenced to death, on the basis that a grand jury had not been
convened.56
The Court decided that due process did not require states to con-
duct grand jury proceedings.57  Although the grand jury had been
used in the past, there was no intention to bind the states to this par-
ticular procedure.58  Also nothing in the commentary of Lord Coke,
48 The Second Amendment provides “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.
49 See Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
50 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 2, at 147–48, 216–18, 220–23; CURTIS, supra note 2, R
at 92–130; Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the
Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1207–25 (1996); cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 959–71 (2009)
(discussing possibility of incorporation after Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)).
51 The Fifth Amendment provides in part “[n]o person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when
in actual service in time of War or public danger.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
52 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034–35 & n.13 (2010).
53 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
54 See id. at 517–19.
55 See id. at 518–19.
56 See id. at 518–20.
57 See id. at 519–38.
58 See id. at 528–29, 531. The Court stated “a process of law, which is not other-
wise forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of
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William Blackstone, or Francis Buller suggested that due process
required a grand jury presentment or indictment.59
The Court recognized that pursuant to the English common law,
it could draw meaning for due process from other governments
beyond England.60  The Court also emphasized that due process in
the Magna Carta did not seek to protect against the legislature61 and
that the system under the Magna Carta was different from the system
in the United States under which the people were protected against
actions of the legislature and other branches.62  Thus, due process in
the United States held more protection but also pursuant to the pro-
tection in England, permitted the methods of protection to be
expanded.63
The Court added that the text of the Fifth Amendment sup-
ported the conclusion that due process did not require grand juries in
settled usage both in England and in this country.” Id. at 528.  The Court went on to
say, however, that “it by no means follows, that nothing else can be due process of law
. . . . But to hold that such a characteristic is essential to due process of law, would be
to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress or
improvement.” Id. at 528–29.
59 See id. at 522–28, 538.  For example, the Court explained what Lord Coke had
stated about the importance of the grand jury to due process; Lord Coke had
described the grand jury as only “an example and illustration” of due process, not as a
requirement of due process. Id. at 523.  The Court stated that a broader, contrary
meaning to Lord Coke’s words would require a nonsensical interpretation of a grand
jury for every crime that involved imprisonment including misdemeanors. See id. at
522–28.
60 See id. at 531 (“There is nothing in Magna Charta [sic], rightly construed as a
broad charter of public right and law, which ought to exclude the best ideas of all
systems and of every age; and as it was the characteristic principle of the common law
to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice, we are not to assume that the
sources of its supply have been exhausted.”).
61 See id.
62 See id. at 531–32.
63 The Court stated that “they must be held to guarantee, not particular forms of
procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property.”
Id. at 532.  They “‘may alter the mode and application, but have no power over the
substance of original justice.’” Id. at 532 (quoting Edmund Burke, Fragments of a
Tract Relative to the Laws Against Popery in Ireland, in 6 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT
HONORABLE BURKE 304, 323 (3d ed. 1869)).  The Court continued:
“[T]he law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will or even at
the whim of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations.
Indeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law
as they are developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and
circumstances.”
Id. at 533 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)).
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the state courts.64  The Fifth Amendment included the grand jury
requirement in addition to the due process requirement.65  Constru-
ing this language against superfluous language, due process in the
Fifth Amendment could not include the grand jury.66  Thus, the same
due process provision in the Fourteenth Amendment could not
require a grand jury.67
The Court concluded that within constitutional constraints Con-
gress determined the meaning of due process within the Fifth Amend-
ment, and similarly the states decided the meaning of due process
within the Fourteenth Amendment.68  Quoting the Supreme Court of
Mississippi, the Court referred to the preservation of “fundamental
rights” as key to the due process right.69  Here, the information by a
magistrate preserved liberty and justice thus satisfying due process.70
In his dissent, Justice Harlan stated that the same due process
right in the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment was
intended to confer the same protections against the states as against
the federal government.71  To decide whether an information was due
process under the Constitution, generally the common law and the
statutes of England prior to the time that the English settled in
America must be examined.72
Due process was derived from and had the same meaning as “by
the law of the land” in the Magna Carta.73  Justice Harlan stated that
the only relevant inquiry in the case was whether an information was
due process of law under the common law for a capital offense.74  He
concluded that it was not; a grand jury was required.75




68 See id. at 535.
69 Id. at 536 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Levee Comm’rs, 50 Miss. 468, 479 (1874)).
70 See id. at 536–38.
71 See id. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
72 See id. at 542.
73 Id. at 542–43 (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855)).  The Magna Carta stated “‘no freeman shall be
taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or
be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we [not] pass upon him,
nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.’”
Id. at 542 (quoting MAGNA CARTA Jun. 15, 1215, cl. 39).
74 See id. at 543.
75 See id. at 543–44.  Apparently addressing the argument of the majority about
the unavailability of grand juries for misdemeanors, he stated that this fact just made
the grand jury more important for crimes for which it was available. See id.  He
quoted Blackstone who stated a person could not be convicted unless twenty-four
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Justice Harlan also rejected the Court’s reasoning that the grand
jury and due process language in the Fifth Amendment compelled a
meaning that excluded the grand jury right from due process.76  He
stated that if so, the many other rights mentioned in the Fifth Amend-
ment also would not be considered due process.77
The right to a grand jury in capital cases was as important to the
Magna Carta or at common law as the right to a jury trial in such
cases.78  The grand jury protected in a different way than the jury trial
right, protecting against “unfounded accusation.”79  The grand jury
right and other rights in the Fifth Amendment were so important that
special mention was made of them so that it was clear that Congress
could not legislate against those rights.80
Justice Harlan concluded by stressing that at the time of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, all states in some form had a
constitutional provision preventing deprivation of life, liberty, or
property without due process, almost every state had a bill of rights
setting forth the rights, twenty-seven states expressly did not permit
people in the grand jury and jury had so decided. See id. at 544 (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *306 [sic]).  He also quoted Blackstone who stated that
informations were appropriate only for misdemeanors. See id. at 544 (quoting 4 WIL-
LIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *309–10 [sic]).  Blackstone had warned that how-
ever “convenient” informations by judges were that the jury was the right price to pay
for liberty. Id. at 544–45 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *349–50
[sic]).  Justice Harlan also referenced several other authorities of the time who stated
that grand juries were required for capital crimes. See id. at 545.  Moreover, under the
common law, the grand jury right was as important as other protections in the Fifth
Amendment such as against double jeopardy, against self-incrimination, and against
the taking of property without just compensation. See id. at 546–47.
76 See id. at 547–48.
77 See id. at 548.
78 See id. at 549.
79 Id.  Justice Harlan quoted the Massachusetts Supreme Court:
The right of individual citizens to be secure from an open and public accusa-
tion of crime, and from the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial,
before a probable cause is established by the presentment and indictment of
a grand jury, in case of high offences, is justly regarded as one of the securi-
ties to the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive public prosecu-
tions, and as one of the ancient immunities and privileges of English liberty.
Id. at 551–52 (quoting Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329, 344 (1857)).
80 See id. at 550.  Lord Coke among others had recognized that informations by
magistrates were not sufficient due process for capital offenses. See id. at 552–53.
Moreover, Justice Harlan emphasized that grand jurors, unlike magistrates, were pri-
vate citizens who, for the most part, did not hold public office, and their participation
protected against improper prosecution. See id. at 554–55.  Justice Harlan further set
forth the importance of the grand jury as described by Justices Wilson and Field. See
id. at 555–56.
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informations for capital crimes, and another ten states implicitly did
not permit informations in capital cases by reference to a law of the
land or due process requirement.81  He stated that the Supreme Court
recognized that “due process of law protects the fundamental princi-
ples of liberty and justice,” and at the same time a grand jury was rec-
ognized as “essential to personal security” under the common law,
“jealously guarded” in the Constitution, and at the time of the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, recognized in all of the states.82
Accordingly, the grand jury must be a requirement of due process.83
Several scholars have written about whether the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the grand jury right against the states,
among them Professors Amar, Michael Curtis, Kurt Lash, Raoul Ber-
ger, and William Nelson.  Professor Amar emphasized that the grand
jury was a check on the possible abuse of government agents.84  He
recognized that the “core meaning” of due process in the Fifth
Amendment was indictment or presentment by a grand jury.85  As for
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, Professor Amar
quoted nineteenth-century commentary by Justice Story and Chancel-
lor Kent, in addition to decisions in the nineteenth century, to sup-
port that due process in the Fourteenth Amendment included the
grand jury right.86  He argued that it is difficult to see why the grand
jury right is not incorporated under either the Due Process Clause or
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.87  Michael Curtis has commented
more generally on incorporation of the rights in the Bill, including
the grand jury right.  He stated that
[t]o me it seems that a natural reading of “privileges or immunities”
is that the phrase is equivalent to “rights.”  The amendment read
that way says that no state shall abridge the rights of citizens of the
United States.  These rights, literally understood, would include all
rights of citizens provided for in the Constitution, including rights
set out in the Bill of Rights.88
81 See id. at 557–58.
82 Id. at 558.
83 See id.
84 See AMAR, supra note 2, at 82–87 (recognizing grand jury, criminal, and civil R
juries as checks on government).
85 Id. at 97.  Professor Amar has recognized that due process might mean more
than a grand jury right, and that others have recognized this, including the Supreme
Court in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
276–77 (1855). See AMAR, supra note 2, at 201–02. R
86 See AMAR, supra note 2, at 200–02. R
87 See id. at 220.
88 Michael Kent Curtis, Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr.
Berger on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 92 (1982).
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Additionally, Kurt Lash recently has discovered new evidence that the
first eight amendments were understood to be “privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States.”89  Different from Professors Amar,
Curtis, and Lash, Professor Raoul Berger argued that the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment had no intention to incorporate the
grand jury right against the states.
Bearing in mind that the purpose of the framers was to secure
the emancipated slaves from violence and oppression and to safe-
guard their rights to exist and make a living, the omission to call to
each state’s attention that it was surrendering its control of grand
juries, of non-use of indictments, and other preliminaries to trial, is
powerful evidence that no such intention existed.90
William Nelson also wrote about the Fifth Amendment grand jury
right and incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Profes-
sor Nelson stated that thinking of the incorporation of rights as equal-
ity instead of as protection made more sense because of an oddity of
incorporation in the nineteenth century—that most states provided
the protections in the Bill of Rights.91  Under this reading, the states
could disregard the grand jury right, and Congress could act when
states did not give rights equally to blacks and whites.92
3. The Sixth Amendment Criminal Jury Unanimity Requirement
Prior to the time that the Supreme Court decided McDonald, the
Court also had decided that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not incorporate the Sixth Amendment criminal jury
unanimity requirement93 against the states.94 Apodaca v. Oregon is
cited for the proposition that the unanimity requirement has not
been incorporated against the states.95 Apodaca had a different pos-
89 Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bing-
ham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329, 400–01 (2011)
(discussing John Bingham’s intention that the rights in the first eight amendments
were understood to be “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”).
90 Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis’ Response,
44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 19 (1983).
91 See NELSON, supra note 2, at 118. R
92 See id. at 118–19.
93 The Sixth Amendment provides in part “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
94 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.14 (2010).
95 See id. (citing Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972) (plurality
opinion)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL104.txt unknown Seq: 14  6-DEC-12 9:06
172 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
ture than the decision not to incorporate the Fifth Amendment grand
jury right and the decision not to incorporate the Seventh Amend-
ment civil jury trial right, which is discussed below.  The Court already
had decided that the Due Process Clause incorporated the Sixth
Amendment criminal jury trial right96 and already had decided that
once a right was incorporated, the same standards for the right
applied against the federal and state governments.97
In the cases in Apodaca, non-unanimous juries convicted the
defendants in state trials, and the Court considered whether those
convictions violated the Sixth Amendment jury trial right.98  In
Apodaca, eight justices stated that the same requirements for the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right applied to federal and state courts.99
Applying this concept, four justices opined that there was no unanim-
ity requirement under the Sixth Amendment for federal and state
courts, while four justices opined that there was a unanimity require-
ment under the Sixth Amendment for federal and state courts.100
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment that unanimity was not
required in the state courts but also stated that unanimity was
required in the federal courts.101  Justice Powell emphasized that the
federal and state criminal jury trial rights were not the same.102  As
stated previously, however, at this time, the case law was clear (and
continues to be), consistent with the opinions of the other eight jus-
tices, that any right that was incorporated against the states had the
same standards as the federal right.103
4. The Seventh Amendment Civil Jury Trial Right
Prior to the time that the Supreme Court decided McDonald, the
Court also had decided that the Seventh Amendment civil jury trial
96 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
97 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964).
98 See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406 (plurality opinion).
99 See id.; id. at 414–15 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356, 395–96 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100 See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406 (plurality opinion); id. at 414–15 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
101 See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 366, 369–77 (Powell, J., concurring).
102 See id.
103 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 & n.14 (2010).  For
recent discussions of this requirement and incorporation, see Kate Riordan, Ten
Angry Men: Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials and Incorporation After McDonald,
101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403 (2011); Chenyu Wang, Rearguing Jury Unanimity:
An Alternative, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 389 (2012).
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right104 was not incorporated against the states.105 Minneapolis & St.
Louis Railroad Co. v. Bombolis is cited for the proposition that the right
to a civil jury trial was not incorporated against the states.106  In that
case, the Court considered whether the state of Minnesota, which did
not require a unanimous jury verdict in a civil trial, violated the Sev-
enth Amendment.107  The plaintiff had brought the case in state court
under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act against the defendant who
had employed a relative of the plaintiff who had allegedly died
because of the defendant’s negligence.108  The defendant company
objected to the jury instruction given after twelve hours of delibera-
tion that five-sixths of the jury could render a verdict.109  The defen-
dant argued that because a federal statute governed the case, the
Seventh Amendment applied to the case, and under the applicable
common law, a unanimous jury trial was required.110
The Court was required to decide whether the Seventh Amend-
ment applied to the states.111  Citing Barron v. Baltimore, among other
cases, the Court stated that it had long been held that the Bill of
Rights applied only to the federal government, and thus, that the Sev-
enth Amendment applied only to the federal courts.112  The Court
stated that the question was not “an open one.”113  Defendant had
argued that because Congress cannot create another federal forum
with no jury trial right to enforce congressionally created laws, then
such laws also cannot be enforced where a Seventh Amendment jury
trial right does not exist, including in the state courts without such
rights.114  Citing several cases, the Court stated that this proposition
had been rejected in the past.115  State and federal courts could
104 The Seventh Amendment provides: “In Suits at common law, where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
105 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034–35 n.13.
106 See id. at 3046 n.30 (citing Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241
U.S. 211, 221–223 (1916)).
107 See Bombolis, 241 U.S. at 216.  Other cases from Virginia, Kentucky, and
Oklahoma were also sent to the Court on this question and other questions. See id. at
215–16.
108 See id. at 215.
109 See id. at 216.
110 See id.
111 See id. at 216–17.
112 See id. at 217 (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833)).
113 Id. at 219.
114 See id. at 220–21.
115 See id. at 221–23.
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enforce each others’ laws in accordance with their own procedures.116
In the decision, the Court did not discuss the Fourteenth Amendment
or due process.
Some scholarship has agreed with the Court’s result although not
with its reasoning.  Professor Amar has agreed that the Seventh
Amendment should not be incorporated.117  However, his position is
based on his theory of refined incorporation.118  To understand how
his theory of refined incorporation affects the Seventh Amendment,
his view on the jury trial right in the Seventh Amendment must be
examined first.  Professor Amar has taken the original position that
under the Seventh Amendment, a particular state’s civil jury trial right
or non-right should govern in the federal courts in that state absent
an explicit congressional act otherwise.119  In other words, if state X
has a civil jury trial right, the federal court in state X will also have a
jury trial right.  However, if state Y does not have a civil jury trial right,
the federal court in state Y will also not have a jury trial right.  And
Congress can act to change the jury trial right in the states.  Thus,
according to Professor Amar, the Seventh Amendment right to a civil
jury trial in the federal courts should be defined by the jury rights in
the states unless Congress has acted.  In support of his position, Pro-
fessor Amar cited sources, which stated that the jury rights in states
varied at the time of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment.120  He
cited other sources which supported that some framers of the original
Constitution argued against a jury trial right, that others argued for a
jury right, and that others argued for a jury trial right based on, for
example, state jury rights.121  Using these sources, Professor Amar
argued that under the Seventh Amendment, states could each deter-
mine their jury trial rights in their federal courts, and Congress could
add jury trial protection if it chose to do so.122
This perspective on the Seventh Amendment right has influ-
enced Professor Amar’s opinion that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not incorporate the Seventh Amendment against the states.123  Profes-
116 See id.
117 See AMAR, supra note 2, at 75–76. R
118 See supra text accompanying notes 36–45.
119 See AMAR, supra note 2, at 89–92. But see Stanton D. Krauss, The Original Under- R
standing of the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 407 (1999)
(disagreeing with Amar regarding adoption of state-rights-based Seventh Amendment
and arguing Congress decides when jury right exists).
120 See AMAR, supra note 2, at 89. R
121 See id. at 90.
122 See id. at 89–90.
123 See id. at 222, 275–76.
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sor Amar took his interpretation of the Seventh Amendment right in
the federal courts based on individual states’ jury rights and applied
his refined incorporation theory to it.124  Under his theory, the Sev-
enth Amendment arguably should not be incorporated, because it was
“rooted in federalism concerns that should not be imposed on
states.”125  In other words, because the correct interpretation, accord-
ing to Professor Amar, of the Seventh Amendment in the federal
courts was based on rights in each state in the absence of a congres-
sional act, the Seventh Amendment was concerned with federalism
and should not be incorporated.  Citing Amar and framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Kevin Newsom also argued against incorpo-
ration of the Seventh Amendment under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.126  Professor Wildenthal, on the other hand, disputed Amar’s
and Newsom’s views of the nonincorporation of the Seventh Amend-
ment and reviewed additional sources that he argued supported
incorporation of the Seventh Amendment under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.127
5. A Theory of Nonincorporation Before McDonald?
Prior to McDonald, the Court affirmatively had decided not to
incorporate the small set of rights in the Bill of Rights described in the
previous section.128  This leads to the question of whether the Court
had a theory of (what this Article terms) “nonincorporation” before
McDonald.  Because selective incorporation, the theory of incorpora-
tion that existed for several years before the Court decided McDonald,
was based on liberty and justice or fundamental rights,129 the simple
answer could be that nonincorporation was based on the opposite; a
124 See id. at 92, 222, 275–76.
125 Id. at 222.
126 See Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpreta-
tion of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 727–32 (2000).  Under one argu-
ment, Newsom stated that some states did not have civil jury trial rights at the time of
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment; this fact argued against incorporation of the
Seventh Amendment. See id. at 729–30.  However, this could be said of any of the
Amendments’ incorporation against the states at the time of the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
127 See Brian H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding
in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61
OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1135–47 (2000); see also James L. “Larry” Wright & M. Matthew
Williams, Remember the Alamo: The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, the
Doctrine of Incorporation, and State Caps on Jury Awards, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 449 (2004).
128 A few amendments have not been addressed at all by the Court.  These amend-
ments are discussed in Part II.A.4.
129 See supra text accompanying notes 26–31.
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provision was not incorporated where it was not a fundamental right.
This concept cannot be applied neatly to the decisions discussed
above, however, because either they were not decided under selective
incorporation or, in the case of the Sixth Amendment unanimity
requirement, the decision was particularly unique.130
At times there is at least some suggestion in the Court’s jurispru-
dence on incorporation that the Court believed it had a theory for not
incorporating rights.  Initially, in the late nineteenth century, if the
right was listed in the Bill of Rights, it was presumptively not a right
protected under due process.131  After the Court began to incorporate
rights, in the early twentieth century, the Court articulated a theory
for why rights had not been incorporated and defended its decisions
not to incorporate rights, including the grand jury right and civil jury
right, as a “rationalizing principle which gives to discrete instances a
proper order and coherence.”132  The Court stated that the criminal
jury trial right, civil jury trial right, and the grand jury trial right “are
not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.  To abolish
them is not to violate a ‘principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’”133
The Court also stated that protections against self-incrimination and
double jeopardy were not fundamental rights.  It went on to explain:
The exclusion of these immunities and privileges [indictment by
grand jury, jury trial, protection against self incrimination, and
double jeopardy] from the privileges and immunities protected
against the action of the states has not been arbitrary or casual.  It
has been dictated by a study and appreciation of the meaning, the
essential implications, of liberty itself.
We reach a different plane of social and moral values when we
pass to the privileges and immunities that have been taken over
130 See supra Part I.B.
131 See Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of
the New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 483–84 n.110 (2001) (discussing
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1935), where the Court “seemed to imply textual
inclusion in the Bill of Rights could be construed as evidence against inclusion as a
due process right”); supra text accompanying notes 20–25.  This changed when the R
post-New Deal Court turned to textual inclusion in the Bill of Rights as justifying
judicial enforcement of rights listed in the Bill, but also justifying the abandonment of
the non-textual right of liberty of contract. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943); see also Lash, supra, at 481–84, 494. (discussing case law demonstrat-
ing the shift in the New Deal Court’s reasoning).  The “Twining” rule was used to
determine which textually listed rights ought to be “incorporat[ed],” a term that
appears only after the New Deal. See id. at 474–75.
132 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
133 Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
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from the earlier articles of the federal bill of rights and brought
within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorption.
These in their origin were effective against the federal government
alone.  If the Fourteenth Amendment has absorbed them, the pro-
cess of absorption has had its source in the belief that neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.134
Of course, since that time, there were changing interpretations of
what constituted liberty, justice, and thus, fundamental rights; the
Court held that some of the rights that it previously stated were not
essential to liberty and justice were essential to liberty and justice and
thus fundamental and incorporated under the Due Process Clause.135
Thus, the Court has not had a consistent theory of incorporation or
nonincorporation over the years.  Moreover, by not examining the
nonincorporated rights, the Court has left itself open to criticism.
Professor Amar stated “[b]y refusing to discuss openly why these three
rights [the civil jury, the grand jury, and the right to bear arms] some-
how were not fundamental enough to justify incorporation, the jus-
tices have seemed to plead no contest to the critics’ charge that
selective incorporation was unprincipled.”136
C. Nonincorporation Pursuant to McDonald
In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court reconsidered
whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Second
Amendment right to bear arms.  In doing so, the Court also discussed
the other parts of the Bill of Rights that previously had been deemed
not incorporated that remained not incorporated after McDonald.
1. McDonald
In McDonald, to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause incorporated the Second Amendment against the
states, the Court stated that “we must decide whether the right to keep
and bear arms is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty . . . or
as we have said in a related context, whether this right is ‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”137  In deciding this case
based on the Due Process Clause, the plurality declined the invitation
134 Id. at 326.
135 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034–36 (2010) (plural-
ity opinion).
136 AMAR, supra note 2, at 220. R
137 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (citation omitted) (quoting Washington v. Gluck-
sberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
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to examine the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.138
Citing District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court stated that self-defense,
including in one’s home, which the regulations at issue involved, was
such a fundamental right and that the right applied to handguns
which were the firearms selected most for protection of the home.139
Also citing Heller, the Court decided that the right to bear arms was
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”140  There was an
explicit English protection of the right to keep arms for self-defense in
the 1689 English Bill of Rights, and in his Commentaries, Blackstone
stated that the right was a “fundamental right[ ] of Englishmen.”141
The colonists, and then the founders, also recognized the importance
of this right.142  In the time period around the founding, many states
also enacted rights to bear arms in their constitutions.143  Thereafter,
in the second half of the nineteenth century, in part in reaction to
discrimination against blacks including the taking of their firearms,
Congress enacted two laws, one of which explicitly protected the right
to bear arms.144  The Fourteenth Amendment followed these laws,
and its enactment history included references to the right to bear
arms.145  Additionally at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, many states granted the right to bear arms in their con-
stitutions.146  Some of these rights reflected limitations of law enforce-
ment and that individuals needed to be able to protect themselves.147
The Court concluded: “In sum, it is clear that the Framers and
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and
bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of
ordered liberty.”148
The plurality of Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia, and Kennedy dis-
puted the arguments of the municipalities including that, because
many civilized countries had no right to bear arms, this right was not
fundamental.149  They stated that there are many rights in this country
138 See id. at 3030–31.
139 See id. at 3036 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008)).
140 Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
141 See id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 594).
142 See id. at 3037–38.
143 See id. at 3037.
144 See id. at 3038–41.
145 See id. at 3041–42.
146 See id. at 3042.
147 See id. at 3042 n. 27.
148 Id. at 3042.
149 See id. at 3044 (plurality opinion).
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that are fundamental that do not exist in other countries.150  Incorpo-
ration “must be governed by a single, neutral principle.”151
Under our precedents, if a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental
from an American perspective, then, unless stare decisis counsels oth-
erwise, that guarantee is fully binding on the States and thus limits
(but by no means eliminates) their ability to devise solutions to
social problems that suit local needs and values.152
The plurality cited previous decisions on the nonincorporation of the
Fifth Amendment grand jury right and the Seventh Amendment civil
jury trial right as a footnote to “stare decisis.”153  It also stated that
some regulations by states were possible, including those against pos-
session of guns by felons, and they dismissed the dissenting opinion’s
arguments on various grounds.154  The plurality did not conduct a
stare decisis analysis apparently because the previous Second Amend-
ment jurisprudence rejecting incorporation occurred prior to selec-
tive incorporation.155  Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment but
decided that the Second Amendment was incorporated under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.156
In the context of deciding whether the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the Second Amendment right to bear arms against the
states, the Supreme Court discussed what this article has termed
“nonincorporation.”157  The Court pointed out the other rights that
the Court previously had decided were not incorporated and sug-
gested that these rights could be incorporated in the future.  It stated
that “[o]ur governing decisions regarding the Grand Jury Clause of
the Fifth Amendment and the Seventh Amendment’s civil jury
requirement long predate the era of selective incorporation.”158  Also,
the Court suggested that no compelling reason existed for the contin-
ued nonincorporation of the Sixth Amendment criminal jury unanim-
ity requirement against the states under the Due Process Clause.159  In
addition to discussing nonincorporation, the Court briefly addressed
the rights for which incorporation was never decided—the Eighth
150 See id. at 3044–45.
151 Id. at 3048.
152 Id. at 3046 (footnote omitted).
153 Id. at 3046 n.30.
154 See id. at 3047–50.
155 See id. at 3031 (plurality opinion); see also infra Part II.B (discussing the role
stare decisis played in the plurality opinion).
156 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058–88 (Thomas, J., concurring).
157 Id. at 3034–35 (plurality opinion).
158 Id. at 3035 n.13.
159 See id. at 3035 n.14.
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Amendment prohibition against excessive fines and the Third Amend-
ment prohibition against the quartering of soldiers.160
In dissent, Justice Stevens decided that due process in the Four-
teenth Amendment did not include the right to bear arms.161  He did
not decide on the basis of incorporation of the Second Amendment,
because the use of the term “incorporation” was “something of a mis-
nomer.”162  The question of whether a right applied against the states
involved whether a particular right was included in due process, not
whether a right was stated explicitly in the first eight amendments.163
Indeed this was “a substantive due process case.”164  Among other
arguments against application of the right to bear arms against the
states, Justice Stevens generally discussed incorporation and empha-
sized that total incorporation had not occurred because the Fifth
Amendment grand jury right and the Seventh Amendment civil jury
trial had not been incorporated against the states.165  Justice Stevens
also contrasted the Court not granting certiorari to petitions on the
also important question of unanimity in state criminal jury trials with
the Court’s decision to take the Second Amendment question and
incorporate it against the states.166  Although the Court generally had
required uniformity between the state and federal courts regarding
incorporation167 it had not required unanimity for state criminal jury
trials at the same time that it had required unanimity for federal crim-
inal jury trials.168
2. A Theory of Nonincorporation After McDonald?
After McDonald, there are a few possible theories of nonincor-
poration for the Court.  Again, the obvious theory of nonincorpora-
tion is the opposite of incorporation under selective incorporation—
that the nonincorporated rights were not fundamental.169  Because
160 See id. at 3035 n.13; see also infra Part II.A.4 (discussing that the Supreme Court
has never addressed incorporation of the Third Amendment prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers or the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive fines).
161 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3088–3120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 3092.
163 See id.
164 Id. at 3090.
165 See id. at 3094.
166 See id. at 3094–95.  Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor,
agreed with Justice Stevens that due process did not include the right to bear arms
and further decided that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the right to
bear arms. See id. at 3120–36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
167 See id. at 3094 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168 See id. at 3094 & n.12.
169 See supra Part I.B.5.
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the Court has not evaluated all of the nonincorporated rights under
selective incorporation, it is difficult to know if the Court thinks these
rights were fundamental.  However, as discussed above, prior to
McDonald, this theory was applied in an inconsistent manner.170  Cer-
tain rights were changed from nonincorporated to incorporated at
the same time that other rights remained unreexamined and thus
nonincorporated.171  Also, after McDonald, at least from the perspec-
tive of Justice Stevens, this theory remains inconsistent, because in
McDonald, the Supreme Court incorporated yet another right but left
no firm indication that it would act to incorporate the remaining
rights if presented with the opportunity.172  The Court had accepted
certiorari on the question of the incorporation of the Second Amend-
ment right, but had refused to grant, for example, certiorari on peti-
tions on the question of unanimity in state criminal jury trials.173
A different way to view nonincorporation is through stare decisis.
In McDonald, the plurality explicitly referenced the Fifth Amendment
grand jury right and the Seventh Amendment civil jury trial right
when it discussed the circumstances for stare decisis of the
nonincorporation decisions.174  With this mention, the plurality sug-
gested that if those rights were fundamental, nothing but possibly
stare decisis stood in the way of the future incorporation of those pro-
visions.  Stare decisis will be examined further in Part II.B.  However,
suffice it to say now, the plurality did not find it necessary to conduct a
stare decisis analysis with respect to the Second Amendment right to
bear arms in McDonald.175
Another possible theory of nonincorporation is no nonincorpora-
tion, or in other words, total incorporation.  In McDonald, the Court
stated that it had never adopted Justice Black’s total incorporation,
but that selective incorporation “moved in that direction.”176  With
the incorporation of the Second Amendment and thus with nearly
every right in the Bill incorporated after McDonald, incorporation of
the first eight amendments could exist after McDonald.
Finally, whether intended or not, the Court may have adopted a
jury theory of nonincorporation.  All of the Bill of Rights that the
170 See supra Part I.B.5.
171 See supra Part I.B.5.
172 See  supra text accompanying notes 161–68.
173 See supra text accompanying notes 166–68.
174 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3046 & n.30 (2010) (plurality
opinion).
175 See infra Part II.B.  In his concurrence, Justice Thomas conducted a stare deci-
sis analysis. See infra text accompanying note 290.
176 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034.
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Court previously decided did not apply to the states and that continue
not to be incorporated are jury provisions—the Fifth Amendment
grand jury right, the Sixth Amendment criminal jury unanimity
requirement, and the Seventh Amendment civil jury trial right.  The
only parts of the Bill the incorporation of which the Court has not
decided at all—the Third Amendment quartering of soldiers and the
Eighth Amendment excessive fines prohibition—presumably would
be incorporated if relevant.177
As for this possible jury theory of nonincorporation, the Court
has not specifically recognized any characteristics about juries that
would cause those amendments to be treated differently.  In the past,
in Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court actually decided that the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated one of the
jury amendments—the Sixth Amendment criminal jury trial right.  In
that case, the defendant, who was black, was accused of battery during
an incident that involved an apparent racial altercation between
whites and blacks.178  Defendant requested a jury trial, and after
denial of this request, the judge convicted him of a misdemeanor,
which was punishable by two years in prison and a fine.179  The judge
sentenced him to 60 days and to pay a fine.180  The Court stated that
the question was “whether given this kind of system a particular proce-
dure is fundamental—whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an
Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.”181  The significant history
of the criminal jury trial right, including under the English common
law, was then described.182  The Court also emphasized that the origi-
nal states’ constitutions included jury trials.183  This was evidence of
the fundamentality of the right.184  Moreover, at the time of the case,
the states continued to conduct criminal jury trials.185  The Court con-
cluded by emphasizing that “[a] right to jury trial is granted to crimi-
nal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government,”186
and “[t]he deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial in
serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement
177 See infra Part II.A.4.
178 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147 (1968).
179 See id. at 146.
180 See id.
181 Id. at 149–50 n.14.  The Court discounted earlier cases, which examined “if a
civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the particular protection.”
Id.
182 See id. at 151–53.
183 See id. at 153.
184 See id. at 153–54.
185 See id. at 154.
186 Id. at 155.
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qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the
States.”187
Ascribing to the Court a theory of nonincorporation based on the
jury may seem unjustified because the Court has incorporated the
criminal jury trial right.  Still, the Court may have adopted a non-pure
theory of nonincorporation based on the jury.  Putting aside the odd
case of unanimity, the Court appears to have a particular affinity for
the criminal jury trial right and possibly an aversion to the civil jury
trial right.  It has expanded the Sixth Amendment criminal jury trial
right such that juries have more fact-finding authority related to sen-
tencing in federal and state courts at the same time that it can be
argued that the Court has curbed the Seventh Amendment civil jury
trial right in federal courts.188  Additionally, it may be that the Court is
comfortable with imposing incorporation in the context of the crimi-
nal jury but is not comfortable in the context of civil juries and grand
juries; the difference may lie in the particular specific liberty interest
that the criminal jury trial involves.  Additionally, though the federal
courts gain no specific benefit from state institutional aggrandize-
ment, the Court also may have some motivation to affect the authority
of state courts and prosecutors, which increases under nonincorpora-
tion.189  In other words, it is difficult to ignore that the rights that the
Court decided not to incorporate and continues not to incorporate
are all jury rights.  With this stated, a jury theory of nonincorporation
might be the least rational under the Constitution.  Of the rights in
the Bill of Rights, the jury could be said to best comprise what tradi-
tionally has been viewed as due process.  The extensive subject of pro-
cedural due process will not be revisited here, however.190
187 Id. at 156.
188 See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role
in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 69 (2003) (stating “[t]he
Supreme Court has not allowed the kinds of limits on the criminal jury that it has
condoned in the civil context”); Suja A. Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 U.
COLO. L. REV. 767 (2005) (discussing criminal and civil juries and division of authority
between judiciary and jury).
189 Of course, courts would have even more power if the Court had not incorpo-
rated the criminal jury trial right; but again, the particular liberty interest there may
have motivated the Court in Duncan.
190 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 2, at 269 (discussing that civil, criminal, and grand R
juries were recognized as “basic components of due process of law” and “‘inestimable
privilege[s]’” in 1866).  “Historical practice is probative of whether a procedural rule
can be characterized as fundamental” and thus required as procedural due process.
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992); see also Dist. Attorney’s Office v.
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II. THE FUTURE OF NONINCORPORATION
Now that only a few provisions of the Bill of Rights have not been
incorporated, the question is: where does this leave nonincorpora-
tion?  To determine whether the Court has a theory of nonincorpora-
tion, it is necessary to examine each of the nonincorporated rights
under the Court’s articulated theory of incorporation—selective
incorporation—and to explore the role of stare decisis.
A. Fundamental Rights?
As stated above, in McDonald, the plurality made its incorporation
decision on the basis of the Due Process Clause.191  The McDonald
analysis involved fundamental rights.  The Supreme Court stated that
to decide whether a right is incorporated “we must decide whether
the right . . . is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty, . . . or as
we have said in a related context, whether this right is ‘deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”192
To determine whether a right was fundamental and thus was
incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has consistently examined
the meaning of due process or what were fundamental rights at the
time of the founding and ultimately at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment.193  In McDonald, to decide whether the right
was fundamental, the Court examined the origin of the right in
England, the adoption of the right in the states around the time of the
ratification of the Bill, the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the protection of the right by the states at the time of the ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment.194  Below, the nonincorporated
rights of the Fifth Amendment grand jury right, the Sixth Amend-
Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 69 (2009) (applying the “fundamental” analysis of Medina to
state postconviction relief frameworks (citing Medina, 505 U.S. at 448)).
Coke referred to the “judgement of his peers,” the jury, as equal to “the law of the
land,” or in other words, due process.  1 EDWARD COKE, 2 THE SECOND PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 46 (1809).  Justice Story also discussed the mean-
ing of due process of law as “without due presentment or indictment, and being
brought in to answer thereto by due process of the common law.  So that this clause
in effect affirms the right of trial according to the process and proceedings of the
common law.”  3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1783 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833) (footnote omitted).
191 See supra Part I.C.1.
192 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (citations omit-
ted) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
193 See id. at 3036–42.
194 See id.
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ment criminal jury unanimity requirement, and the Seventh Amend-
ment civil jury trial right are examined under this selective
incorporation analysis.  Additionally, the other rights, the incorpora-
tion of which the Court has not addressed at all, are discussed
summarily.
1. The Fifth Amendment Grand Jury Right
The grand jury was a fundamental right in England in the time
period surrounding the founding.  William Blackstone, who had sig-
nificant influence upon the founders, stated:
[T]o find a bill [for a person to be indicted], there must at least
twelve of the jury agree: for so tender is the law of England of the
lives of the subjects, that no man can be convicted at the suit of the
king of any capital offence, unless by the unanimous voice of twenty
four of his equals and neighbours: that is, by twelve at least of the
grand jury, in the first place, assenting to the accusation; and after-
wards, by the whole petit jury, of twelve more, finding him guilty
upon his trial.195
Blackstone also stated that all cases, except misdemeanors, required
grand juries, and for misdemeanors, informations were permitted.196
Moreover, in his chapter on the criminal jury trial, Blackstone empha-
sized the importance of the grand jury in addition to the criminal
jury.197  He stated “[o]ur law has therefore wisely placed this strong
and twofold barrier, of a presentment and a trial by jury, between the
liberties of the people, and the prerogative of the crown.”198  When
discussing the grand jury, Blackstone also emphasized that:
[H]owever convenient [other forms of proceeding] may appear at
first, (as doubtless all arbitrary powers, well executed, are the most
convenient) yet let it be again remembered, that delays, and little
inconveniences in the forms of justice, are the price that all free
nations must pay for their liberty in more substantial matters . . . .199
Prior to this time, Lord Coke, whom Blackstone cited, had stated that
“[n]o man shall be taken (that is) restrained of liberty, by petition, or
195 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *301.  Blackstone did leave room that if
twelve members of the grand jury agreed, the accused could be indicted even though
everyone did not agree on a twenty-three-person grand jury. Id. at *299, *301.
196 See id. at *305.
197 See id. at *343.
198 Id.
199 Id. at *344.  He further warned of the jury disappearing by stating “and that,
though begun in trifles, the precedent may gradually increase and spread, to the utter
disuse of juries in questions of the most momentous concern.” Id.
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suggestion to the king, or to his councell, unless it be by indictment,
or presentment of good, and lawfull men, where such deeds be
done.”200
In America, at the time of the founding, the grand jury also was a
fundamental right.  Alexander Hamilton suggested the importance of
the grand jury when, in a discussion of the inefficiency of civil juries
for the collection of taxes, he stated that indictments and criminal
juries are, however, necessary for prosecution for failure to pay
taxes.201  In the state debates legislators asserted that the absence of a
provision in the Constitution that required a grand jury did not per-
mit informations by judges.202  Early nineteenth century commenta-
tors also remarked on the fundamental nature of the grand jury right.
In his Commentaries on the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, Jus-
tice Story stated that “it is obvious, that the grand jury perform most
important public functions; and are a great security to the citizens
against vindictive prosecutions, either by the government, or by politi-
cal partisans, or by private enemies.”203  When he discussed parts of
the Bill of Rights including the grand jury, James Kent stated “[t]he
Constitution of the United States, and the constitutions of almost
every state in the Union, contain the same declarations in substance,
and nearly in the same language” and stated that these provisions
were “transcribed into the constitutions in this country” from England
to guard the “right of personal security.”204  Kent further stated that
where there was no express constitutional provision in the states these
“fundamental” doctrines would have been set forth in the legislative
acts, because the “colonies were parties to the national declaration of
rights in 1774, in which the trial by jury, and the other rights and
liberties of English subjects, were peremptorily claimed as their
200 COKE, supra note 190, at 46 (footnote omitted). R
201 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
202 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADEL-
PHIA IN 1787, at 112–13 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S
DEBATES] (debates of Mr. Gore & Mr. Dawes in the Convention of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts on the adoption of the Federal Constitution on Jan. 30,
1788); 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 154 (debate of Mr. Spencer in the Convention of the State
of North Carolina on the adoption of the Federal Constitution on July 29, 1788)
(“The trial by jury has been also spoken of.  Every person who is acquainted with the
nature of liberty need not be informed of the importance of this trial.  Juries are
called the bulwarks of our rights and liberty . . . .”).
203 STORY, supra note 190, § 1779.
204 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *12 (The Blackstone Publish-
ing Co. 1889) (1827).
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undoubted inheritance and birthright.”205  Further, Kent specifically
stated that “[t]he words, by the law of the land, as used in magna carta, in
reference to this subject, are understood to mean due process of law,
that is, by indictment or presentment of good and lawful men . . . .”206
In addition to these commentaries, at the time of the founding, there
is evidence in the states that the grand jury was a fundamental right.
Of the fourteen states, four explicitly provided a grand jury for felo-
nies, and four others provided for some form of grand jury.207
At the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, there
is also significant evidence that the grand jury remained a fundamen-
tal right.  The Civil Rights Act of 1866 required due conviction by jury,
which could have included the grand jury.208  Moreover, the adoption
of the Thirteenth Amendment just three years prior to the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment suggested the importance of the grand
jury at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption.  The Thir-
teenth Amendment specifically stated that slavery and involuntary ser-
vitude had been abolished in absence of a person being “duly
convicted.”209  Again, this due conviction could have included the
grand jury.  Additionally, evidence existed in the statements of the
proponents and opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights, although
most of this evidence relates to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.210
205 Id. at *12–13.
206 Id. at *13. (footnote omitted).
207 See Kaitlyn Luther, Table of History of Jury Rights (Feb. 10, 2012) (unpub-
lished table compiled by research assistant for purposes of this article) (on file with
the author, Suja A. Thomas).
208 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
209 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
210 Representative Bingham discussed how a proposed version of the Fourteenth
Amendment gave Congress the power to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states.
“The proposition pending before the House is simply a proposition to arm the Con-
gress of the United States, by the consent of the people of the United States, with the
power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution today.” CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
Representative Rogers, who opposed the amendment, responded that the pro-
posed amendment usurped the power of the states and gave such power to the federal
government. See id. at 133 (statement of Rep. Rogers).  He also discussed how “‘life,
liberty, property, privileges, and immunities’” in the proposed Fourteenth Amend-
ment included all rights. Id.  Further, Representative Rogers said:
What are privileges and immunities?  Why, sir, all the rights we have under
the laws of the country are embraced under the definition of privileges and
immunities.  The right to vote is a privilege.  The right to marry is a privi-
lege.  The right to contract is a privilege.  The right to be a juror is a privi-
lege.  The right to be a judge or President of the United States is a privilege.
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There is also evidence in the states that the grand jury right was a
fundamental right.  Twenty-six out of thirty-seven states guaranteed a
right to a grand jury at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.211
Following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Enforcement Act of 1871, which was enacted to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment, provided for civil and criminal liability and signif-
icant penalties for tampering with jurors, showing the general
importance of the jury to the liberty of the freed people.212  Moreover,
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 explicitly prevented interference with
freed people’s right to serve as jurors for grand and petit juries.213
Additional support for the incorporation of the grand jury comes
from the other parts of the Fifth Amendment.  In the past, the other
rights in the Fifth Amendment—double jeopardy, self-incrimination,
I hold if that ever becomes a part of the fundamental law of the land it will
prevent any State from refusing to allow anything to anybody embraced
under this term of privileges and immunities.
Id.  Bingham later responded that states had inappropriately violated rights in the Bill
and that the Fourteenth Amendment corrected this injustice, stating:
[M]any instances of State injustices and oppression have already occurred in
the State legislation of this Union, of flagrant violations of the guarantied
privileges of citizens of the United States, for which the national Govern-
ment furnished and could furnish by law no remedy whatever.  Contrary to
the express letter of your Constitution, “cruel and unusual punishments”
have been inflicted under State laws within this Union upon citizens . . . .
Id at 2542 (statement of Rep. Bingham).  And in subsequent discussions in the Sen-
ate, Senator Howard explicitly stated that the first eight amendments in the Bill were
incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment: “To these privi-
leges and immunities, whatever they may be—for they are not and cannot be fully
defined in their entire extent and precise nature—to these should be added the per-
sonal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitu-
tion.” Id. at 2765 (statement of Sen. Howard) (also quoting the privileges and
immunities stated in the circuit court decision of Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)).
211 See Luther, supra note 207; supra text accompanying note 81; cf. Steven G. R
Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions When the Four-
teenth Amendment was Ratified in 1868: What Rights are Deeply Rooted in American History
and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 78–79 (2008) (stating nineteen states required
grand jury indictment for felonies and seven prohibited prosecution solely by
information).
212 See Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1–2, 5, 17 Stat. 13, 13–15 (1871).
213 See Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 335, 336–37 (1875).
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and just compensation—were found fundamental and incorporated
under the Fourteenth Amendment.214
Thus, examining the Fifth Amendment grand jury right through
selective incorporation shows the right was incorporated.  Evidence
from the time of the founding through the time of the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, plus the constitutional text, demon-
strates that the grand jury was a fundamental right and thus was incor-
porated against the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
2. The Sixth Amendment Criminal Jury Unanimity Requirement
As the Court has stated, the federal courts and state courts have
different standards on unanimity, with unanimity required in the fed-
eral courts and not in the state courts, even though under the Court’s
jurisprudence, state rights that were incorporated were to have the
same standards as the federal rights.215  This division on unanimity
was the result of an odd decision, as the Court has stated.216
However, unanimity in criminal jury trials has a long, significant
history.  In describing the criminal jury trial more generally, Black-
stone described it “as the grand bulwark of [every Englishman’s] liber-
ties.”217  He pointed out that this right was even more important than
the civil jury right because of the possibility of governmental abuse.218
Blackstone went on to state that an indictment by twelve or more
grand jurors “should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suf-
frage of twelve of his equals and neighbours, indifferently chosen, and
superior to all suspicion.”219  Moreover, Blackstone stated that “the
214 Cf. STORY, supra note 190, § 1781 (after discussing the grand jury, Justice Story R
recognized that the privilege against double jeopardy was “another great privilege
secured by the common law” (emphasis added)).
215 See supra Part I.B.3.
216 See supra text accompanying note 159.  An extensive discussion of the Sixth R
Amendment unanimity requirement is also found in a certiorari petition that requests
the Court to overrule Apodaca. v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 7–8, Lee v. Louisiana, 555 U.S. 823 (2008) (No. 07-1523). See generally
Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior of the
Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2006) (discussing importance of
unanimity).
217 BLACKSTONE, supra note 195, at *342.
218 See id. at *343.
219 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL104.txt unknown Seq: 32  6-DEC-12 9:06
190 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
liberties of England cannot but subsist, so long as this palladium
remains sacred and inviolate . . . .”220
At the time of the founding in America, unanimity was men-
tioned in the debates in the states, almost as if this was simply
accepted required practice.221  There is also evidence that although
the incidents of jury trial were not explicitly stated in the Bill, the jury
trial was not divested of those incidents.222
In the early nineteenth century, Justice Story more generally dis-
cussed the essential nature of the different components of the crimi-
nal jury trial right.
[U]nless the whole [common law] system is incorporated, . . . a cor-
rupt legislature, or a debased and servile people, may render the
whole little more, than a solemn pageantry.  If, on the other hand,
the people are enlightened, and honest, and zealous in defence of
their rights and liberties, it will be impossible to surprise them into a
surrender of a single valuable appendage of the trial by jury.223
The evidence of incorporation of unanimity in the Thirty-ninth
Congress at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
consists of general references to the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights, again mostly related to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.224
Moreover, non-unanimous jury verdicts were not common at this
time.225
In summary, examining the Sixth Amendment criminal jury una-
nimity requirement through the lens of selective incorporation shows
that the requirement was incorporated.  Evidence from the time of
the founding through the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
demonstrates that the Sixth Amendment criminal jury unanimity
requirement was a fundamental right and thus was incorporated
220 Id.  Blackstone listed possible incursions on liberties that included “introduc-
ing new and arbitrary methods of trial, by justices of the peace, commissioners of the
revenue, and courts of conscience.” Id. at *343–44.
221 Ratification of the State of New York, 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 202, at
327, 328 (the debates in the New York Convention on the adoption of the Federal
Constitution on July, 26, 1788) (“No person can be found guilty without the unani-
mous consent of such jury.”).
222 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 202, at 530–31 (James Madison’s remarks in
the Virginia Convention on June 20, 1788) (explaining peremptory challenges to
jurors exist along with jury trial right although no express provision for peremptory
challenges).
223 STORY, supra note 190, § 1784. R
224 See, e.g., supra note 210. R
225 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 211, at 77.  The Constitution of Vermont R
required unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
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against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
3. The Seventh Amendment Civil Jury Trial Right
The civil jury right also has a long, significant history.226  In his
discussion of the civil jury, Blackstone wrote of the jury as fundamen-
tal to liberty, saying that “[i]n magna carta [trial by jury] is more than
once insisted on as the principal bulwark of our liberties; but espe-
cially . . . that no freeman shall be hurt in either his person or prop-
erty” without trial by jury.227  Coke, whom Blackstone cited here, had
stated that “lands, tenements, goods, and chattels shall not be seised
into the kings [sic] hands, contrary to this great charter, and the law
of the land; nor any man shall be disseised of his lands, or tenements,
or dispossessed of his goods, or chattels, contrary to the law of the
land.”228  “Law of the land,” the term in the Magna Carta, was
equivalent to “due process” in the Constitution, and thus it follows
that due process included trial by jury.229
At the time of the founding, Alexander Hamilton stated that
there was agreement that the civil jury was valuable.  Any difference in
opinion was based on its specific role with respect to liberty: “the for-
mer regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it
as the very palladium of free government.”230  Hamilton himself
thought the civil jury was not related to the preservation of liberty.  He
could not “readily discern the inseparable connection between the
existence of liberty and the trial by jury in civil cases” as the trial by
jury in criminal cases solely related to liberty.231  Moreover, he stated
that “[t]he excellence of the trial by jury in civil cases appears to
depend on circumstances foreign to the preservation of liberty.”232
Despite this disagreement on the role of the civil jury to liberty, the
importance of the civil jury to the founders was evident.  When con-
cern was expressed that including a provision for the criminal jury
226 The most comprehensive modern history is found in Professor Wolfram’s arti-
cle on the Seventh Amendment.  See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of
the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1972) (discussing the federal right to a
civil jury trial); see also Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amend-
ment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966) (arguing that the Seventh Amendment was not
intended to codify a rigid form of jury practice).
227 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *350.
228 1 COKE, supra note 190, at 46. R
229 See STORY, supra note 190, § 1783. R
230 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 201, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton). R
231 Id.
232 Id. at 500.
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trial in the Constitution implied that no civil jury trial right existed,
the founders quoted Blackstone on the general importance of the jury
trial to protect property, liberty, and life.233  Hamilton also recognized
that the jury was “an excellent method of determining questions of
property,” and therefore it would be ideal to have a constitutional pro-
vision for a civil jury trial.234
The issue at the time of the founding was not whether there
should be a civil jury trial right in the states but the extent of the jury
trial right given the differences among the states.235  Indeed, the fact
that the Bill of Rights was insisted upon as a condition for the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution is an indication of the fundamental nature of
the rights in the Bill, including the civil jury.236  Finally, the impor-
tance of the civil jury trial right at the time of the founding is indi-
cated by the significant number of states that adopted civil jury trial
rights in the time period surrounding the ratification of the Constitu-
tion.  Eleven of fourteen states protected the civil jury trial right.237
After the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, Jus-
tice Story suggested the importance of the civil jury to liberty when he
discussed the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of law and
fact to which some in the convention had objected; he discussed the
“great securities [to the people’s] civil, as well as [ ] their political,
rights and liberties” necessitated that the Court could review fact only
in equity, admiralty, and maritime cases, or the jury trial in both civil
and criminal cases would be a “mere mockery.”238  He more directly
stated the Seventh Amendment:
233 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 202, at 503–05 (reprinting a letter from Rich-
ard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph).  Various states emphasized the importance of
the jury trial generally. See, e.g., id. at 328 (reprinting the debates in New York regard-
ing adopting the Federal Constitution) (“That the trial by jury, in the extent that it
obtains by the common law of England, is one of the greatest securities to the rights
of a free people, and ought to remain inviolate.”).
234 THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 201, at 501 (Alexander Hamilton). R
235 See id.  Indeed a jury provision was not included because of the essentially
impossible task of guaranteeing the states the jury trial of each state in the federal
courts. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 168 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) (James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention, Dec. 11, 1787) (“In some
of the States they have courts of chancery and other appellate jurisdictions, and those
States are as attached to that mode of distributing justice, as those that have none are
to theirs.”).
236 See STORY, supra note 190, § 1774. R
237 See Luther, supra note 207; cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, R
3037 (2010) (describing number of states protecting right to bear arms at time of
founding).
238 STORY, supra note 190, § 1757. R
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is a most important and valuable amendment; and places upon the
high ground of constitutional right the inestimable privilege of a
trial by jury in civil cases, a privilege scarcely inferior to that in crim-
inal cases, which is conceded by all [persons] to be essential to polit-
ical and civil liberty.239
In his Commentaries, Kent suggested the fundamental nature of
the civil jury.  He stated that:
[i]n October, 1765, a convention of delegates from nine colonies
assembled at New York, and made and published a declaration of
rights, in which they insisted that the people of the colonies were
entitled to all the inherent rights and liberties of English subjects, of
which the most essential were, the exclusive power to tax them-
selves, and the privilege of trial by jury.240
In his discussion of the meaning of due process, Kent cited Coke and
among other things further described that “[t]he judgment of his peers
means, trial by a jury of twelve men according to the course of the
common law; and even in private suits at common law, the right of
trial by jury is preserved in the Constitution of the United
States . . . .”241  Kent also discussed the importance to personal secur-
ity of protection from slander and libel and discussed the role of the
civil jury to aid in this protection.242
Similar to other rights in the Bill, some evidence of their incorpo-
ration, albeit mainly pursuant to the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
is in the statements of the Thirty-ninth Congress.243  Moreover, while
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not often explicitly
discuss the civil jury right, the intention of the Framers to protect
freed people, including their property, necessitated the civil jury trial
right.  Without the ability to bring a suit with a jury trial right against
states and individuals for violation of their property rights, property
rights for freed people could be illusory, particularly in states that did
not fully recognize the rights of freed people.244  Related to this, the
fundamentality of rights may have relationships to each other.  If, for
239 See id. § 1762.
240 2 KENT, supra note 204, at *5. R
241 Id. at *13 & n.(b).
242 Id. at *16–23.
243 See supra note 210. R
244 See, e.g., IND. CONST. of 1851, art. XIII, §§ 1–2 (amended 1881) (forbidding
settling of and voiding existing contracts with “Negroe[s] or Mulatto[es]”); see also An
Act to Confer Civil Rights on Freedmen, and for Other Purposes, ch. 4, 1865 Miss.
Laws 82 (providing for apprenticeships and indentureships of “negroes” and “mul-
latoes”);  An Act to Regulate the Relation of Master and Apprentice, as Relates to
Freedmen, Free Negroes, and Mulattoes, ch. 5, 1865 Miss. Laws 86.
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example, the right to bear arms is fundamental and would be availa-
ble to freed people,245 arguably so too must the right to a civil jury
trial.  The history of the jury right is tied to differences between judges
and juries, including judges’ connections to government.246  In other
words, if no mechanism to enforce the right to bear arms against the
government exists—that is, through the enforcement by a jury—then,
the right could be illusory.  As another example, if the states could
take property for just compensation from citizens under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, there must be a right for a jury to make the
determination of just compensation.247  Additional evidence of the
fundamental nature of the civil jury right at the time of the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment is found in the states.  The constitu-
tions of thirty-six of thirty-seven states guaranteed civil juries.248
This examination of the Seventh Amendment jury trial right
through selective incorporation shows that the right was incorporated.
Evidence at the time of the founding through the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates that the Seventh Amendment
was a fundamental right and thus was incorporated against the states
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As stated throughout the Article, this Article examines
nonincorporation through the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.
With that stated, Professor Amar has articulated a noteworthy
approach to incorporation of the Seventh Amendment that is differ-
ent from the jurisprudence of the Court and is important to address.
Part I.B.4. described that Professor Amar has taken the view that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Seventh Amend-
ment.  Under his view, the Seventh Amendment right in the federal
courts was based on the jury right in the courts of the state where the
federal court sat, and Congress could alter the right.249  In support of
his opinion, Professor Amar showed that the founders of the original
Constitution had different opinions about the necessity or desirability
of a civil jury trial right in the Constitution and that some thought the
jury right should be based on each state’s right.250  Using his view of
245 See supra Part I.C.1.
246 See Thomas, supra note 188, at 779–82. R
247 Professor Amar recognized some interrelationship of the rights, including the
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights with jury rights. See AMAR, supra note 2, at R
23–24, 68–75, 80, 87–88.  He, however, thought the Fourteenth Amendment justified
putting certain matters in judges’ rather than jurors’ hands, including First Amend-
ment issues. Id. at 242–44.
248 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 211, at 77; Luther, supra note 207. R
249 See supra text accompanying notes 117–125. R
250 See supra text accompanying notes 117–125. R
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the Seventh Amendment right in the federal courts and his theory of
refined incorporation, Professor Amar stated that while the civil jury
trial right may be fundamental, the right was not incorporated against
the states, because the right was based on federalism concerns.251  The
question is what meaning can be derived from the support Professor
Amar uses for his view that the right was based on federalism
concerns.
An examination of other statements during this time period is
illuminating.  Alexander Hamilton discussed how the absence of a
civil jury provision in the original constitution permitted Congress to
legislate regarding the matter.252  It follows that once the founders
adopted the Seventh Amendment, Congress did not decide the scope
of the jury trial right; it was determined by the language in the Sev-
enth Amendment.
Professor Amar acknowledged that Hamilton did not think the
jury trial right in the federal courts should be based on the states’
rights.253  Hamilton thought such a system would be irrational.254  In
discussing the proposal of Massachusetts which referred to “common
law” and which was based on its own jury trial provision, Hamilton
stated this proposal was unacceptable because each of the states had
different experiences of what they considered common law jurisdic-
tion and that a “uniform plan” would need to be adopted.255  Hamil-
ton also discussed how most cases would be subject to jury trial under
the state constitutions, because most cases would be in the state
courts.256  Again, this opinion shows that Hamilton did not think that
the state court jury rules would apply in federal court.
Similar to many parts of the Constitution, the meaning of the
Seventh Amendment is not apparent.257  However, some meanings
may be more palpable than others.  The meaning argued for by Pro-
fessor Amar would require the jury trial right in a federal court in a
state to depend on that state’s decision at any point in time, including
at the time of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment (and corre-
spondingly under his refined incorporation theory, no incorporation
of the civil jury trial right against the states).  However, if the language
of the Amendment, which requires that “the right of trial by jury shall
251 See supra text accompanying notes 117–125. R
252 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 201, at 496–97 (Alexander Hamilton). R
253 See AMAR, supra note 2, at 89. R
254 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 201, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton). R
255 See id. at 506–07.
256 See id. at 498–99.
257 See Wolfram, supra note 226. R
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be preserved”258 is taken seriously, there was no right to preserve in
states which did not exist at the time of the adoption of the Amend-
ment, and thus, such a meaning derived on states is nonsensical at
least as to those which did not exist and which were presumably antici-
pated in the future.  Professor Amar also stretched the language of
the Amendment in another way.  He tried to argue that “preserved” in
the Seventh Amendment has the same meaning as the “reserved to
the States” language in the Tenth Amendment, and thus that this lan-
guage also supports states deciding the scope of their civil jury trial
rights in their federal courts.259  However, the very different “pre-
served” language in the Seventh and the “reserved to the States” lan-
guage in the Tenth instead support different meanings for the words,
which were adopted at the same time—in the Tenth for power to the
states and in the Seventh for no such power to the states.260  Professor
Amar did leave room for criticism of his position on the Seventh
Amendment, stating that his stated view of the Seventh Amendment
was “not free from doubt.”261
4. The Third Amendment Quartering of Soldiers and the Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fines Prohibition
The Supreme Court has not decided the question of the incorpo-
ration of the Third Amendment quartering of soldiers against the
states or the question of the incorporation of the Eighth Amendment
excessive fines prohibition against the states.262  Thus, these rights do
not fall under the definition of nonincorporated rights set forth in
this Article.263  Unlike the Fifth Amendment grand jury right, the
Sixth Amendment unanimity requirement, and the Seventh Amend-
ment civil jury trial right, these rights rarely surface.  Also, as discussed
below, there is some suggestion in McDonald and other jurisprudence
of the Court that these provisions would be incorporated if the issues
came to the Court.  As a result of this possibility, as well as the focus
on the nonincorporated rights in this Article, these provisions will be
examined only summarily.
258 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
259 See AMAR, supra note 2, at 90. R
260 U.S. CONST. amends. VII, X.  Professor Amar argued that because state courts
would hear actions against federal officials for violations of Fourth Amendment
rights, those courts should decide whether a jury trial right existed. See AMAR, supra
note 2, at 91. R
261 AMAR, supra note 2, at 89. R
262 See supra text accompanying note 160.
263 See supra Part I.
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The incorporation of the Third Amendment quartering of
soldiers has never been decided, because almost never are soldiers
quartered in private houses.264  In McDonald, the Court made some
suggestion that it would decide the question affirmatively.  It cited a
Second Circuit decision as a case of first impression that held that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporated the Third
Amendment against the states.265  The Second Circuit had agreed
with the district court, which had held that the Third Amendment was
incorporated “[u]nder any of the theories extant, perhaps most likely
as a right ‘so rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental’ and thus ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.’”266
The Supreme Court also has not decided the question of the
incorporation of the Eighth Amendment excessive fines prohibition
against the states.  Because the Court has decided that the prohibition
against excessive fines applies only to the direct imposition of exces-
sive fines by governments, the excessive fines prohibition appears to
have had limited application up until this point.267
Previously, in Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,268
the Court, citing Furman v. Georgia,269 actually stated that the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporated the prohibi-
tion against excessive fines in the Eighth Amendment.270 Furman
concerned, however, only the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment and the excessive bail prohibitions, not the Eighth
Amendment’s excessive fines prohibition.271
Schilb v. Kuebel272 and Robinson v. California273 are the decisions
cited in support of the incorporation of the cruel and unusual and
excessive bail provisions of the Eighth Amendment.274  Those deci-
sions, however, do not explain the incorporation of those provi-
264 See AMAR, supra note 2, at 220. R
265 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034–35 n.13 (2010) (citing
Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1982)).
266 Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citations omitted).
267 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
268 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
269 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
270 Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 433–34.
271 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–41.
272 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
273 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
274 See McDonald v. City of Chicago,, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034–35 n.12 (2010).
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sions,275 and thus, those decisions do not help guide whether their
sister provision of the excessive fines prohibition in the Eighth
Amendment was incorporated.  If it is accepted that the excessive
bail276 and the cruel and unusual prohibitions were incorporated
properly against the states, however, there is no textual reason that
the excessive fines prohibition also should not have been incorpo-
rated against the states.  Indeed the English Bill of Rights included the
same language regarding excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and
unusual punishment that the Framers adopted in the Eighth Amend-
ment, and at the time of the Constitution’s framing, similar provisions
appeared in some of the states’ constitutions.277
B. Stare Decisis
In McDonald, the plurality recognized the possible relevance of
stare decisis to incorporation questions for the Fifth Amendment
grand jury right and the Seventh Amendment civil jury trial right and
not for the Sixth Amendment criminal jury unanimity requirement
which, as discussed above, was decided in a peculiar manner with a
different rule for the federal courts and the state courts.278  With
275 Indeed Schilb simply stated that “the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of
excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment.” Schilb, 404 U.S. at 365.
276 McDonald cited Schilb for the proposition that the excessive bail provision
applies to the states through the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.
See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034–35 n.12.  One scholar has disputed the notion that
the excessive bail provision was incorporated prior to McDonald.  He said that McDon-
ald itself incorporated the Eighth Amendment excessive bail prohibition. See Samuel
Wiseman, McDonald’s Other Right, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 23 (2011).  Professor Wise-
man wonders how the Court “so cavalier[ly]” incorporated this right in a footnote.
Id. at 26 (citing McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034–35 n.12–13).  Wiseman argues that
under the principles in McDonald, incorporation of the Eighth Amendment was nec-
essary; there could not be excessive bail where there is a presumption of innocence.
At the same time, Wiseman appreciates the limited importance of the incorporation
of the Eighth Amendment.  The interpretation of the Eighth Amendment protects
against “only the most extreme legislatures and courts, and the most careless.” Id. at
29.
277 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 243 (1972).  The prohibition against
excessive fines has a long history.  As stated above, it was expressly mentioned in the
1689 English Bill of Rights.  Also, as one example, in 1868, Mississippi adopted a pro-
hibition against excessive fines, along with a plethora of other rights the same as or
similar to the ones in the Bill of Rights. See MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 8.
278 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3046 n.30 (plurality opinion); supra text accompany-
ing note 169–70.  Apparently, the Court believed stare decisis did not apply to the
decision on the Sixth Amendment criminal jury unanimity requirement. See McDon-
ald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 n.14.
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respect to the Second Amendment right to bear arms, the plurality
did not perform any stare decisis analysis when it decided that the
Due Process Clause incorporated the Second Amendment against the
states.  They stated that previous decisions in Cruikshank, Presser, and
Miller did not preclude incorporation because those decisions “all pre-
ceded the era in which the Court began the process of ‘selective incor-
poration’ under the Due Process Clause, and [the Court had] never
previously addressed the question whether the right to keep and bear
arms applies to the States under that theory.”279  This language sug-
gests that the plurality did not conduct a stare decisis analysis because
the nonincorporation of the Second Amendment was decided prior
to selective incorporation.280  However, if this is the case, the plurality
should not have suggested that a stare decisis analysis was necessary to
analyze the questions of the incorporation of the Fifth Amendment
grand jury right and the Seventh Amendment civil jury trial right
because the nonincorporation of both of those provisions also
occurred prior to selective incorporation.281
The question becomes whether some basis for stare decisis
existed for nonincorporation of the Fifth Amendment grand jury
right and the Seventh Amendment civil jury trial right that did not
exist for the nonincorporation of the Second Amendment right to
bear arms.  Unlike the right to bear arms that was decided in the past
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause and not under the Due
Process Clause, in Hurtado, nonincorporation of the grand jury right
was decided under the Due Process Clause.282  It is unclear under
what part of the Constitution nonincorporation of the Seventh
Amendment was decided because Bombolis mentioned neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor due process.283  Arguably, stare decisis
analyses are appropriate for the grand jury right and the civil jury trial
right, because nonincorporation occurred or might have occurred
already under the Due Process Clause.
With that said, a stare decisis analysis also may have been appro-
priate for the right to bear arms.  At least two justices believed that the
279 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031 (plurality opinion)
280 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031.
281 See id. at 3035 n.14.
282 See supra Part I.B.2.  Subsequently, the Court also decided that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause did not incorporate the grand jury right. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176
U.S. 581, 584–602 (1900).
283 See supra Part I.B.4.  At the time of Bombolis, the Court already had stated that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not incorporate the Seventh Amendment. See
Maxwell, 176 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1900); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875); Edwards
v. Elliott, 88 U.S. at 532 (1874).
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Privileges or Immunities Clause was the proper basis for incorporation
of the Second Amendment.  First, although Justice Thomas concurred
with the plurality on the judgment, he expressly stated that the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause was the proper manner to incorporate the
Second Amendment.284  Second, in his concurrence, Justice Scalia
wrote about his “acquiesc[ence]” regarding “substantive due process”
including the incorporation of the Second Amendment under the
Due Process Clause.285  This statement suggests that Justice Scalia
believed that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was the correct man-
ner to incorporate the Second Amendment.  He used originalism to
argue that the right to bear arms was fundamental, but he did not
actually believe that under originalism the Due Process Clause permit-
ted incorporation of such substantive rights.286  Many scholars have
written that if rights in the Bill are to be incorporated against the
states, incorporation must occur under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.287  Why Justice Scalia and other justices articulated the incor-
poration decision under the Due Process Clause is not clear.  It could
have been in order not to upset the years of precedent on incorpora-
tion under the Due Process Clause.288  It also could have been that the
decision under the Due Process Clause avoided a stare decisis analysis,
because previous Second Amendment decisions were decided under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.289  Despite these possible justifi-
cations, because at least two justices, and possibly more who com-
prised the majority in McDonald, believed that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was the appropriate basis for the incorporation of
the right to bear arms in McDonald, the nonincorporation of the right
to bear arms under the Privileges or Immunities Clause arguably
should have been subject to a stare decisis analysis.  Justice Thomas
284 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058–88 (Thomas, J., concurring).
285 Id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing its long history and limited
application).
286 See id. at 3048–50; cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18
J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409 (2009) (discussing original public meaning original-
ism in the context of the question of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause).
287 See, e.g., Brief for Academics for the Second Amendment as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No.
08–1521), 2009 WL 4099518; Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and
Life After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV.
1071 (2000); Lash, supra note 89 (arguing the original meaning of the Privileges or R
Immunities clause leads to application of the Bill of Rights against the states).
288 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030–31.
289 See id.
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was, however, the only justice to conduct a stare decisis analysis for the
incorporation of the Second Amendment in McDonald.290
Putting aside the criticism of the plurality’s failure to perform a
stare decisis analysis in McDonald for the Second Amendment right to
bear arms, the question is whether stare decisis prevents the incorpo-
ration of the Fifth Amendment grand jury right and the Seventh
Amendment civil jury trial right.  In McDonald, in its brief discussion
of the possibility of stare decisis for the Fifth Amendment grand jury
trial right and the Seventh Amendment civil jury trial right, the Court
stated that as a result of Hurtado, most states do not require grand
juries, and as a result of Bombolis, states do not require civil juries for
small claims.291  To the extent that these facts are relevant to whether
stare decisis should apply, eighteen states currently require grand
juries for crimes punishable by prison for a year or longer, and
although states do not require civil juries for small claims matters,
forty-six states require civil juries for non-small claims matters.292  The
relevance of current state jury rights to stare decisis is questionable,
however.  Many cities had gun regulations, which may have been in
violation of the Second Amendment after McDonald, and these facts
did not influence the Court’s decision.293  The recent Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission294 case, in which the Court decided that the
First Amendment prohibited certain limitations on the political
speech of corporations, was another recent example where the Court
decided to overrule precedent and where legislatures’ actions would
need to be overruled.  In the Court’s discussion of stare decisis there,
it stated “‘[b]eyond workability, the relevant factors in deciding
whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the antiq-
uity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course
whether the decision was well reasoned.’”295  The Court decided that
290 See id. at 3084–88 (Thomas, J., concurring).
291 See id. at 3046 n.30 (plurality opinion).
292 See Luther, supra note 207.  Also forty-seven states require a unanimous crimi- R
nal jury verdict. See id.
293 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047; Joan Biskupic, High Court to Define Reach of
Gun-Control Laws, USA TODAY (Mar. 16, 2010, 12:53 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
news/washington/judicial/2010-02-26-gun-control-laws_N.htm (“It sets up another
major constitutional question with ramifications for scores of mostly urban gun regu-
lations”); cf. Brief for States of Illinois, Maryland, and New Jersey as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No.
08–1521), 2010 WL 59029, at *27–33 (discussing reliance of states on Court’s deci-
sions not to incorporate the Second Amendment, Seventh Amendment, and Fifth
Amendment grand jury rights).
294 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
295 Id. at 912 (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792–93 (2009)).
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Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,296 the case being overruled,
was not well reasoned.297  Moreover, despite the fact that legislatures
may have relied on Austin and prohibited expenditures, this action
was not sufficient because “legislative acts [cannot] prevent us from
overruling our own precedents, thereby interfering with our duty ‘to
say what the law is.’”298
Additionally, McDonald, and prior to that, District of Columbia v.
Heller, suggested that some regulation of a right was possible after
incorporation.299  Similarly here, if the Fifth Amendment grand jury
right and Seventh Amendment civil jury trial right are incorporated,
states may have some flexibility to lessen the impact of
incorporation.300
Ultimately, the Court has recognized that stare decisis has less
force for constitutional questions like the Second Amendment ques-
tion in McDonald, the First Amendment question in Citizens United,
and the Fifth and Seventh Amendment incorporation questions
here.301  Also, given that the rights were fundamental,302 applying
stare decisis for only the nonincorporation decisions on the grand
jury and the civil jury appears unprincipled.  In his dissent in BMW v.
Gore,303 Justice Scalia stated “[w]hen . . . a constitutional doctrine
adopted by the Court is not only mistaken but also insusceptible of
principled application, I do not feel bound to give it stare decisis
effect—indeed, I do not feel justified in doing so.”304
Moreover, as described above, significant weight should be given
against the application of stare decisis where the previous decisions
296 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
297 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911–12.
298 Id. at 913 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
299 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010); District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–28 (2008).
300 The extent of this flexibility would depend on the substance of the right being
intact. See Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Practice, and the English
Common Law, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 687, 696 (2004) (discussing substance of the civil jury
trial right).
301 See CSX Transp. Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630 (2011) (quoting Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989)) (regarding stare decisis in statu-
tory interpretation); Patterson, 491 at 172–73 (“Considerations of stare decisis have
special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of
constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress
remains free to alter what we have done.”).
302 See supra Part II.A.
303 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
304 Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the inappropriate application of
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to strike down state jury damage
award in civil case).
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were not well reasoned.  In Citizens United, the fact that the previous
decision in Austin was not well reasoned had significant weight in the
decision not to apply stare decisis.305  Further, Justice Thomas’s analy-
sis in McDonald not to apply stare decisis to the former privileges or
immunities cases also was based on the improper reasoning of those
decisions.306  Thus, here, as described above, where the
nonincorporation decisions were not well reasoned, indeed based on
the wrong theory of incorporation, according to the Court now, there
should be significant weight against stare decisis as well.
Here, also, special consideration against stare decisis should be
given where the power of the jury is involved.  The jury shares with
and competes with the judiciary for power.307  However, the jury can
possess power only when power is given to it.308  Thus the jury cannot
do anything to regain power when power is taken away from it.309
Accordingly, stare decisis should not preclude changing the
nonincorporation decisions.310
C. Assessing a Theory of Nonincorporation for the Court
After McDonald, there were several possible theories of
nonincorporation of rights in the Bill of Rights under the Court’s
jurisprudence.311  Under one, the nonincorporated rights of the
grand jury, the criminal jury unanimity requirement, and the civil jury
were not fundamental.312  As shown above, however, the
nonincorporated rights were fundamental rights.313  Under a second
theory of nonincorporation, the nonincorporated rights would not be
incorporated because of stare decisis.314  As described above, though,
there is no reason stare decisis should apply to these rights in particu-
lar.315  A third possible theory of nonincorporation after McDonald is a
305 See supra text accompanying notes 296–98.
306 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3084–88 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
307 See Thomas, supra note 188. R
308 See id.
309 See id.
310 Professor Kurt Lash has balanced originalism, popular sovereignty, and stare
decisis, and he has concluded that “erroneous judicial entrenchment of a constitu-
tional right” and “[e]rroneous failures to intervene to rectify a distortion in the politi-
cal process” preclude stare decisis.  Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and
Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1460, 1466 (2007).
311 See supra Part I.C.2.
312 See supra Part I.C.2.
313 See supra Part II.A.
314 See supra Part I.C.2.
315 See supra Part II.B.
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jury theory of nonincorporation because all of the nonincorporated
rights are jury rights.316  However, under the Court’s jurisprudence,
there is no justifiable reason to preclude jury rights specifically from
incorporation.317  The final theory of nonincorporation is none or in
other words, no nonincorporation.318  No nonincorporation indeed
would be consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has changed course from the nonincorpora-
tion of rights in the Bill of Rights to the incorporation of some of
these same rights.  After the recent decision of the Supreme Court in
McDonald v. Chicago, very few rights, which the Supreme Court previ-
ously decided were not incorporated, remain not incorporated.  Only
the previously nonincorporated rights of the Fifth Amendment grand
jury, the Sixth Amendment criminal jury unanimity requirement, and
the Seventh Amendment civil jury trial have not been incorporated.  A
few possible theories of nonincorporation exist.  However, as this Arti-
cle has described, none of these theories is defensible under the
Court’s jurisprudence.  Accordingly, it is an appropriate time for the
Court to incorporate these remaining rights, and in doing so, the
Court’s jurisprudence on incorporation itself will be more justifiable.
316 See supra Part I.C.2.
317 See supra Part I.C.2.
318 See supra Part I.C.2.
